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Lincoln and Habeas: Of Merryman and
Milligan and McCardle
John Yoo
Three cases define the Supreme Court’s encounter with the
Civil War: Ex parte Merryman,1 Ex parte Milligan,2 and Ex parte
McCardle.3 All three case names bear the styling “ex parte”
because all three were brought on behalf of citizens detained by
the armed forces of the Union. All three detainees sought release
under the ancient writ of habeas corpus, which requires the
government to demonstrate to a federal judge the factual and
legal grounds for detention.4 I will explain why the cases of the
Civil War did not assume the landmark importance, despite their
circumstances and language, as a Marbury v. Madison,
McCullough v. Maryland, or Brown v. Board of Education, but
instead showed the deferential attitude of the Supreme Court to
the other branches of the government during wartime.
Merryman was a Maryland militia officer who had blown up
railroad bridges between Washington, D.C. and the North, and
was training secessionist troops in the earliest days of the Civil
War.5 Milligan was an alleged member of an insurgent force in
Indiana that was sympathetic to the Confederacy.6 He was tried
and sentenced by a military commission—an old form of ad hoc
military court established by commanders for the trial of
violations of the laws of war and the administration of justice in
occupied territory.7

Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Chapman Law School (2008-09);
Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley; Visiting Scholar, American
Enterprise Institute. The author thanks Ben Petersen and Janet Galeria for outstanding
research assistance. An earlier version of this essay was delivered as part of the 2008
Leon Silverman lecture series of the Supreme Court Historical Society.
1 Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
2 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
3 Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
4 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004).
5 See Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 144–46; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 90 (1993) [hereinafter “Paulsen, The Merryman Power”].
6 Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 6.
7 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Story of Ex Parte Milligan: Military Trials, Enemy
Combatants, and Congressional Authorization, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 93, 95–
96, 105–06 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2008).
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In both Merryman and Milligan, federal courts ordered the
release of the petitioners on the ground that the military had
exceeded its constitutional authority.8 Both contained stirring
language about the vitality of constitutional rights even under
the pressure of wartime and the need to maintain checks and
balances on the executive’s wartime powers.9 In Merryman,
Chief Justice Taney, writing an opinion in chambers, protested
that the military had arrested suspected Confederates in
Maryland and refused to recognize civilian authorities without
the approval of Congress.10 Taney had ordered General George
Cadwalader, commander of Fort McHenry, to appear in his
courtroom on May 27, 1861, and to bring the imprisoned
Merryman with him.11 Cadwalader refused to obey.12 Taney
held the general in contempt of court, but the U.S. Marshal could
not gain entry to the fort.13
Taney then issued an opinion ordering Merryman’s release.14
The Constitution has “been disregarded and suspended,” Taney
wrote from his courtroom in Baltimore, “by a military order,
supported by force of arms.”15 He warned that “if the authority
which the constitution has confided to the judiciary department
and judicial officers, may thus, upon any pretext or under any
circumstances, be usurped by the military power, at its
discretion, the people of the United States are no longer living
under a government of laws.”16 Instead, Taney proclaimed,
“every citizen holds life, liberty and property at the will and
pleasure of the army officer in whose military district he may
happen to be found.”17 He ordered the opinion and all of the
proceedings sent to the new President. “It will then remain for
that high officer, in fulfillment of his constitutional obligation to
Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 147–48, 152; Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 107.
Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 149–50; Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 118–28.
See MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES 10 (1991).
11 Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 146.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 146–47. For some background on John Merryman and the history of the
case, see JAMES F. SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY: SLAVERY, SECESSION, AND
THE PRESIDENT’S WAR POWERS 186–98 (2006) and Arthur T. Downey, The Conflict
between the Chief Justice and the Chief Executive: Ex Parte Merryman, 31 J. S. CT. HIST.
262 (2006). For a useful essay on Milligan, see Bradley, supra note 7. The cases also
receive attention in DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION (2003); JAMES G. RANDALL,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (rev. ed. 1964) (1951). On the experience of
Maryland at the outbreak of the Civil War, see generally DEAN SPRAGUE, FREEDOM
UNDER LINCOLN 1–44 (1965); Charles B. Clark, Baltimore and the Attack on the Sixth
Massachusetts Regiment, April 19, 1861, 56 MD. HIST. MAG. 39 (1961).
14 Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 146–47.
15 Id. at 152.
16 Id.
17 Id.
8
9
10
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‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed,’ to determine
what measures he will take to cause the civil process of the
United States to be respected and enforced.”18
Milligan, decided five years later, sounded a similar theme.
Justice Davis declared: “The Constitution of the United States is
a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and
covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all
times, and under all circumstances.”19
Rejecting Attorney
General Speed’s argument (and Lincoln’s) that the war gave the
executive branch the right to hold Milligan and try him by a
military court, the Court responded: “No doctrine, involving more
pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man
than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of
the great exigencies of government.”20 Claims to the contrary
risked “anarchy or despotism,” and led from a false assumption,
“for the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers
granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence; as
has been happily proved by the result of the great effort to throw
off its just authority.”21 The Court held that the military could
not detain and try Milligan in “the theatre of active military
operations” where “the courts are open, and in the proper and
unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction.”22 Only if a foreign
invasion were “actual and present,” rather than threatened,
could martial law prevail.23
Nevertheless, neither Merryman nor Milligan has secured a
place in the firmament of great Supreme Court decisions.
Merryman remains unknown to almost all but those scholars who
toil in the academic fields of the separation of powers or the early
days of the Civil War.24 As we will see, it did little to delay
Lincoln from ordering the detention of suspected Confederate
spies, sympathizers, and conspirators behind the Union lines.
Merryman usually receives attention in work on the early days of
the Civil War, filled with stories of the struggle between
Unionists and Southern sympathizers in Maryland and the other
border states. Rarely do we learn about the legal response to the
opinion, which included outright presidential defiance and a
Id. at 153.
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120–21 (1866).
Id. at 121.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 127.
23 Id.
24 For the most penetrating recent work, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L. J. 217 (1994)
[hereinafter “Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch”] and Paulsen, The Merryman Power,
supra note 5.
18
19
20
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critique of the role of the Supreme Court in American society.
The Merryman opinion itself is rarely reproduced in prominent
casebooks used for the teaching of constitutional law, which
usually relegate the case to a one-paragraph note in discussions
of the debate over judicial review.25
Milligan, on the other hand, has seen a burst of attention in
this decade. This is due entirely to the Bush administration’s
policies in the War on Terror and the associated cases taken up
by the Rehnquist Court.26 Aside from this recent interest in the
decision, Milligan usually goes unexamined and unremembered.
In his Pulitzer Prize-winning book, The Fate of Liberty: Abraham
Lincoln and Civil Liberties, historian Mark Neely titled a chapter
“The Irrelevance of the Milligan Decision.”27
Despite the
opinion’s broad language, for example, military trials continued
throughout the occupied South.28 As Neely observes, scholars
were kinder to the decision.29 The first American encyclopedia on
political science, published in 1881, provides an entry on military
commissions that holds that they can be used for purposes
directly contrary to Milligan.30 In 1890, Professor John Burgess
of Columbia University, the leading political scientist on
Reconstruction at the turn of the century, wrote: “It is devoutly to
be hoped that the decision of the Court may never be subjected to
the strain of actual war. If, however, it should be, we may safely
predict that it will necessarily be disregarded.”31
Remembrance of Merryman and Milligan usually occurs
during wartime. Perhaps this should come as no surprise, as
that is the context within which they were decided. But they
usually do not have much effect. During World War I, neither
Merryman nor Milligan had any direct relevance because no
military commissions or detentions occurred on American soil.
During World War II, the Supreme Court narrowed Milligan to
its facts. In Ex parte Quirin,32 the Court upheld the military
detention and trial of Nazi saboteurs—one of whom was an
American citizen—on the orders of President Franklin
Roosevelt.33
According to the unanimous Quirin majority,

25 See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2005) (failing
to mention Merryman at all).
26 See Bradley, supra note 7, at 93.
27 NEELY, supra note 10, at160–84.
28 Id. at 176–77.
29 See id. at 179–81.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 181.
32 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
33 Id. at 20, 47; see also David Danelski, The Saboteurs’ Case, 1 J. S. CT. HIST. 61
(1996).
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Milligan stood for the proposition that the military could not
apply the laws of war to civilians in areas outside the battlefield
where the civilian courts remained open.34 But it did not apply to
those covered by the laws of war, namely combatants.35 The
Court held: “Milligan, not being a part of or associated with the
armed forces of the enemy, was a non-belligerent, not subject to
the law of war.”36 Milligan most notoriously had no effect on the
Court’s decision in Korematsu v. United States, which upheld
President Roosevelt’s order and Congress’s approval of the
military detention of about 120,000 Japanese-Americans for their
suspected disloyalty.37
Milligan’s lack of relevance has continued to this day. In
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a four-Justice plurality upheld the detention
of an alleged terrorist, a U.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan,
but required judicial review of the detention to protect due
process standards.38
Nevertheless, the Hamdi plurality
concluded that Milligan did not require a civilian trial because it
did not apply to prisoners who had joined or associated
themselves with enemy forces.39 Both Hamdi, and later Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, take Quirin as the relevant gloss over the original
Milligan precedent.40 Today’s law schools do only slightly better.
Most leading casebooks relegate Milligan to summary notes of no
more than one or two pages.41 Most concentrate on Ex parte
Quirin, the case of the Nazi saboteurs tried by military
commission or the enemy combatant cases decided in the last
four years.42 Professors probably spend more time teaching
students about the Supreme Court’s protections for the national
market in milk.43
McCardle, which provides the epilogue to our story, involved
a Vicksburg, Mississippi newspaper editor tried by a military
commission for publishing “incendiary and libelous” articles
calling for violence against Union authorities.44 Because of
Milligan, Congress stripped the Supreme Court of jurisdiction in
McCardle and prevented the Court from reviewing the
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45–46.
Id.
Id. at 45.
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219–20 (1944).
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509–10 (2004).
Id. at 521–22.
40 Id. at 522; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590–93 (2006).
41 See, e.g., STONE, ET AL., supra note 25, at 386–87, 396–97.
42 See, e.g., id. at 383–98
43 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456 (1981); United
States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934).
44 See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
34
35
36
37
38
39
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constitutionality of Military Reconstruction.45 Without going too
much into the details of McCardle, the decision may help us
understand why Merryman and Milligan failed to revolutionize
the judicial role in wartime.
I.
Lincoln faced national security challenges that have never
confronted another American president. This was true with the
Civil War in toto, the deadliest, most destructive war in our
history,46 where American fought American, and brother fought
brother. It was also true in the personal sense. Except for James
Madison’s flight from the capital in the face of British invaders in
1814, the nation’s government has never been under the direct
threat of immediate attack as it was during the Civil War.47
When the South seceded, Washington, D.C. was the midnineteenth century version of West Berlin—an island of freedom
surrounded by a sea of enemy territory. On the one side lay
Virginia, the very capital of the Confederacy.48 You can see
General Robert E. Lee’s ancestral home in Arlington from
downtown Washington. On the other three sides was Maryland,
a slave state that had voted for John Breckinridge of Kentucky
(as had all of the states of the Deep South) in the 1860 election.49
The only rail links between the North and the nation’s capital
passed through Maryland.50 Throughout the Civil War, and even
as late as 1864, Confederate forces would periodically threaten
the capital with attack.51
That precarious strategic situation made it imperative that
the Union secure the Border States such as Maryland. Lincoln
reportedly said, for example, that while he welcomed God’s
support, he must have Kentucky’s.52 He could just as easily have
said that of Maryland. It was the necessity to ensure that
Maryland remained in the Union that led to Merryman.53 When
Fort Sumter fell, it appeared to Northerners that Maryland
might join the states of the upper South in secession.54 Sumter
45 Jesse Choper & John Yoo, Wartime Process: A Dialogue on Congressional Power
to Remove Issues from the Federal Courts, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1254 (2007).
46 See C. Vann Woodward, Editor’s Introduction to JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE
CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA xvii, xviii–xix (1988).
47 See MCPHERSON, supra note 46, at 285–86.
48 Id. at 284–85.
49 See id. at 230, 232, 284–85.
50 Id. at 284–85, 287.
51 See generally id.
52 CHARLES PIERCE ROLAND, AN AMERICAN ILIAD: THE STORY OF THE CIVIL WAR 42
(2002).
53 See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 24, at 278.
54 NEELY, supra note 10, at 4.
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surrendered on April 14, 1861; the next day Lincoln issued a
proclamation requesting 75,000 volunteers to suppress the
rebellion and enforce federal law.55 Lincoln’s intention to use
force to compel the Southern states to return to the Union
prompted Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas to
secede.56 Sentiment to follow their example in Maryland was
strong. Maryland’s governor and Baltimore’s mayor telegraphed
Lincoln to warn him to “[s]end no troops here.”57 Lincoln even
had to travel secretly through Baltimore on his way to his
inauguration.58
Maryland’s resistance quickly turned violent. Rushing to
defend Washington, D.C. on April 19, the Sixth Massachusetts
regiment was attacked by a secessionist mob as it switched
railroad lines in Baltimore.59 Four soldiers and a dozen civilians
were killed.60 For the following week, Maryland rebels succeeded
in isolating the capital from the North.61 The mayor and chief of
police in Baltimore ordered the destruction of the railroad
bridges running to the North.62 Secessionists cut the telegraph
lines between the North and the capital.63 Washington officials
expected a Confederate attack on the defenseless capital at any
moment.64 It was not until April 25 that reinforcements from
New York arrived, and only then by bypassing Baltimore to the
east.65
Meanwhile, Lincoln and his advisors worried about how to
keep Maryland in the Union.66 At first, Lincoln presented his
homespun humor, but within it was a steely determination. On
April 22, when a delegation of the Baltimore YMCA came to see
him and asked that he stop federal troop movements and make
peace with the Confederacy, Lincoln exclaimed that they “would
have me break my oath and surrender the Government without a
blow. There is no Washington in that—no Jackson in that—no
manhood nor honor in that.”67 He explained that in order to
55 Proclamation Calling Militia and Convening Congress, (Apr. 15, 1861), in 4 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 331–32 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953); DAVID
HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 296 (1995).
56 MCPHERSON, supra note 46, at 278–82.
57 DONALD, supra note 55, at 297.
58 Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra note 5, at 90.
59 MCPHERSON, supra note 46, at 285.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 DONALD, supra note 55, at 299.
66 Id.
67 Reply to Baltimore Committee (Apr. 22, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 55, at 341–42.
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defend the capital, Union troops must cross Maryland. “Our men
are not moles, and can’t dig under the earth; they are not birds,
and can’t fly through the air. . . . Keep your rowdies in
Baltimore,” he warned, “and there will be no bloodshed.”68
Lincoln took a prudent attitude toward the Maryland state
government. When the Maryland legislature met on April 26,
General Winfield Scott proposed to arrest them rather than let
them secede.69 Lincoln, however, ordered him off to await the
outcome of their deliberations; if they did vote to secede, he
ordered Scott “to the bombardment of their cities—and in the
extremist necessity, the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus.”70 Lincoln’s April 25 order appears to be the first official
mention of the idea of suspending the writ, and its tie to the
other option of bombarding Maryland cities reflects the extreme
pressures on the President.
Luckily, the legislature did
nothing.71
Nevertheless, concerns about rebel marauders and the
security of the rail link between Washington and Maryland led
Lincoln to take that step of “extremist necessity” just two days
later. In an order to General Scott, the President declared:
You are engaged in repressing an insurrection against the laws of the
United States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of the military line,
which is now used between the City of Philadelphia and the City of
Washington . . . you find resistance which renders it necessary to
suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus for the public safety, you,
personally . . . are authorized to suspend that writ.72

Scott immediately authorized the commanders in Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Delaware, and Washington to suspend the writ if
necessary.73 Neither Lincoln nor Scott publicized the order, nor
did they issue it as a public proclamation, nor was it sent to the
courts or Congress at the time.74 Lincoln would publicly suspend
the writ in Florida in a public proclamation on May 10.75
John Merryman was one of the Maryland citizens swept up
by Union troops after the suspension of habeas corpus.76 He was
Id.
DONALD, supra note 55, at 299.
Abraham Lincoln to Winfield Scott (Apr. 25, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 55, at 344.
71 DONALD, supra note 55, at 299.
72 Abraham Lincoln to Winfield Scott (Apr. 27, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 55, at 347.
73 1 THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE
UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES 567–68 (Nat’l Historical Soc’y, 2d ser. 1971) (1894).
74 NEELY, supra note 10, at 9.
75 Proclamation Suspending Writ of Habeas Corpus in Florida (May 10, 1861), in 4
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 55, at 364–65.
76 DONALD, supra note 55, at 299.
68
69
70
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a farmer, state legislator, and an officer in the Maryland
militia.77 Union officers accused him of drilling a secessionist
cavalry unit that had participated in the destruction of the
railroad bridges and telegraph lines leading to the North in
April.78 Troops arrested him at his home on May 25, 1861 and
imprisoned him at Fort McHenry.79 Merryman immediately
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus directly with Chief Justice
Taney in chambers at the Supreme Court, rather than to the
federal court in Baltimore.80 In one of those happy historical
coincidences, historian Carl Swisher reports that Merryman’s
father and Taney had gone to Dickinson College together.81 Chief
Justice Taney, of course, was a Marylander who had become
Andrew Jackson’s Attorney General and then Secretary of the
Treasury during the great Bank War.82 As Chief Justice, he
wrote the majority opinion in Dred Scott v. Sanford, which, by
holding the Compromise of 1850 unconstitutional, hastened the
coming of the Civil War.83
Taney moved with alacrity to defend Merryman’s rights, but
with little success. He personally rushed to Baltimore to take up
the case rather than wait in the capital. The very next day, he
issued a writ to General George Cadwalader, commander of Fort
McHenry, to appear before him and to bring Merryman with
him.84
Cadwalader was no simple-minded soldier, but the son of a
distinguished Philadelphia family.85 Law and War ran in his
blood. He was a peculiar American breed of soldier-lawyer in the
tradition of Colonel Alexander Hamilton and General Henry
Halleck. His grandfather, John Cadwalader, was a brigadiergeneral in command of Pennsylvania troops during the
Revolutionary War.86 He had served under Washington at the
battles of Trenton and Princeton.87 He was supposed to support
Washington’s crossing of the Delaware, but couldn’t get his
Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra note 5, at 90.
Id.
CARL B. SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-64, 5 THE OLIVER WENDELL DEVISE:
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 844 (1974).
80 See NEELY, supra note 10, at 10.
81 SWISHER, supra note 79, at 845.
82 BERNARD C. STEINER, LIFE OF ROGER BROOKE TANEY: CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 7–8, 100–02, 144 (Gaunt, Inc. reprint 1997).
83 Paul Finkelman, Scott v. Sandford: The Court’s Most Dreadful Case and How it
Changed History, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 13 (2007).
84 Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 146 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
85 See generally The Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Collection 1454,
Cadwalader Family Papers (2007), available at http://www.hsp.org/files/
findingaid1454cadwaladerpart1.pdf.
86 Id. at 2–3.
87 Id. at 3.
77
78
79
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artillery across the frozen river.88
His father, Thomas
Cadwalader, graduated from the University of Pennsylvania,
entered the bar, and reached the rank of major general in
command of the First Division of the Pennsylvania militia during
the War of 1812.89 The pressure was on for son George. Born in
Philadelphia in 1806, he went to Penn like his father, graduated
at the ripe old age of 17, and was later admitted to the bar.90 He
became a general and served with distinction in the MexicanAmerican War of 1848.91 His brother was a federal district judge
in Philadelphia at the outbreak of the Civil War.92
Cadwalader sent an aide to Taney’s courtroom in full
military regalia to notify the Chief Justice that neither he nor
Merryman would appear.93 The aide relayed Cadwalader’s
response, that “he is duly authorized by the president of the
United States . . . to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, for the
public safety.”94 Although a “high and delicate trust,” and one to
be exercised “with judgment and discretion,” the General claimed
his instructions were “that in times of civil strife, errors, if any,
should be on the side of the safety of the country.”95 He asked for
a postponement of the proceedings until he could receive
instructions from President Lincoln.96 Taney instead issued an
immediate contempt order against Cadwalader.97 But the U.S.
Marshal was denied entry at the gate of the fort.98
Taney was left to issue an opinion, which sought to pull the
heart out of Lincoln’s energetic response to the fall of Fort
Sumter. The Constitution’s discussion of the suspension occurs
in one sentence, in Article I, Section 9, and it does so in the
passive voice: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it.”99 Taney held that the
Suspension Clause’s placement in the Article where Congress’s
powers lay, and judicial commentary since ratification,

Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 5; see also 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: A POLITICAL
SOCIAL, AND MILITARY HISTORY 335 (David Stephen Heidler, Jeanne T. Heidler, & David
J. Coles eds., 2000).
91 The Historical Society of Pennsylvania, supra note 85, at 5.
92 Id.
93 Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 146 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487); see also
Swisher, supra note 79, at 845.
94 Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 146.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 147.
99 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
88
89
90
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recognized that only Congress could suspend the writ.100 If
military detention without trial were permitted to continue,
Taney wrote, “the people of the United States are no longer living
under a government of laws.”101
Without congressional
suspension, “every citizen holds life, liberty and property at the
will and pleasure of the army officer in whose military district he
may happen to be found.”102 Taney’s opinion not only found
Lincoln’s suspension unconstitutional, but it clearly questioned
the legal bases for Lincoln’s other unilateral responses to
secession, such as the calling up of volunteers, the imposition of a
blockade on Southern ports, and the withdrawal of funds from
the Treasury to raise an army.103
Taney’s decision in Merryman was not just an attack on
Lincoln’s suspension of the writ, but upon the President’s right to
interpret the Constitution. Lincoln had come to office criticizing
the Supreme Court for its decision in Dred Scott.104 During the
Lincoln-Douglas debates, he had argued that the Court’s decision
only applied to slave and owner in the case itself, and not to any
other cases.105 In his First Inaugural Address, Lincoln declared
that “if the policy of the government, upon vital questions,
affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions
of the Supreme Court the people will have ceased, to be their own
rulers, having, to that extent, practically resigned their
government, into the hands of that eminent tribunal.”106 The
Court had lost immense prestige, at least with Republicans, who
rejected the idea of judicial supremacy behind the decision in
Dred Scott and suspected the federal courts of supporting slavery
and the South.107
For Taney, however, the President’s oath to uphold the
Constitution required him to carry out the Supreme Court’s
orders.108 The Merryman decision was another declaration of
judicial supremacy in interpreting the Constitution, to be
expected of the Justice who wrote Dred Scott, though perhaps not
from President Andrew Jackson’s former attorney general.
Taney clearly wanted to dramatize the conflict between the
100
101
102
103
104

(1946)

Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 148.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 152.
See id. at 149; SIMON, supra note 13, at 200.
ROY P. BASLER, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 22–23, 396

See id. at 417–18.
Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 55, at 262, 268.
107 See SIMON, supra note 13, at 138–39.
108 See BERNARD C. STEINER, LIFE OF ROGER BROOKE TANEY: CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 497–98 (Greenwood Press 1970) (1922).
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President and the judiciary. He appeared before a crowd at the
Baltimore courthouse to receive General Cadwalader’s response,
and declared that the general was defying the law and that he
too might be under military arrest soon.109
Public response to Chief Justice Taney’s decision in the
North was, for the most part, withering. “The Chief Justice takes
sides with traitors, throwing around them the sheltering
protection of the ermine,” thundered the New York Tribune,
probably the North’s most influential newspaper.110 “When
treason stalks abroad in arms, let decrepit Judges give place to
men capable of detecting and crushing it.”111 It claimed that
Taney had engaged in “a gross perversion of [the Court’s] powers
to employ [the writ of habeas corpus] as the protecting shield of
rebels against a constitutional government.”112 It concluded that
“[n]o Judge whose heart was loyal to the Constitution would have
given such aid and comfort to public enemies.”113 Nor did The
New York Times display much charity to the elderly Chief
Justice: “Too feeble to wield the sword against the Constitution,
too old and palsied and weak to march in the ranks of rebellion
and fight against the Union, he uses the powers of his office to
serve the cause of the traitors.”114 A few Republican organs
supported Taney, concluding that although Lincoln’s actions may
be necessary, the Court should not bless them, but instead
should enter the violation of the Constitution on the record, “to
stand as a warning, in more peaceful times yet to come, that here
is an act, the necessity of which was the justification, and which
is not to be made a precedent at any time when the public
exigency is less pressing.”115
Lincoln answered Taney, and the widespread claims of
executive dictatorship, in his message to the special session of
Congress on July 4, 1861.116
Lincoln stressed that the
Confederacy had fired the first shot before Lincoln or the
national government had taken any action that might threaten
slavery.117 The South’s action, therefore, was not the response to
any unconstitutional action of the government, but an effort to

See id. at 492–94.
2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 369 (rev.
ed. 1926) (1922).
111 Id.
112 Id. at 369–70.
113 Id. at 370.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 370–71.
116 Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 55, at 421–41.
117 Id. at 423–26.
109
110
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overturn the results of democratic elections and a rejection of the
constitutional processes of “time, discussion, and the ballot
box.”118 In response, Lincoln argued, “no choice was left but to
call out the war power of the Government; and so to resist force,
employed for its destruction, by force, for its preservation.”119
Lincoln claimed he had responded with the support of public
opinion: “These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were
ventured upon, under what appeared to be a popular demand,
and a public necessity; trusting, then as now, that Congress
would readily ratify them.”120 Lincoln avoided the question
whether he had acted unconstitutionally, but justified his actions
on Congress’s political support after the fact: “It is believed that
nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency of
Congress.”121 That summer, Congress enacted a statute, not
explicitly authorizing war against the South, but rather declaring
that Lincoln’s actions taken that spring “respecting the army and
navy of the United States, and calling out or relating to the
militia or volunteers from the States, are hereby approved and in
all respects legalized and made valid, . . . as if they had been
issued and done” by Congress.122
Lincoln directly responded to the Chief Justice too, but not
by name. He acknowledged that the “legality and propriety” of
the suspension has been questioned, and that the “attention of
the country” had been directed to his presidential duty “to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.”123 He made a nod
toward the idea that the government could violate a single law, if
that act would save the country: “Are all the laws, but one, to go
unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one
be violated?”124 Lincoln argued that he would break his oath to
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution if he blindly
obeyed one provision above the survival of the Republic.125 But
Lincoln was too good a lawyer to rely solely on claims of a
Lockean prerogative.126 He claimed that the Suspension Clause’s
passive tense left open the question of who could suspend the
writ:

Id. at 425.
Id. at 426 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 429.
Id.
122 Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, § 3, 12 Stat. 326 (1861).
123 Message to Congress in Special Session, supra note 116, at 429–30 (internal
quotations omitted).
124 Id. at 430.
125 Id.
126 JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 37–38 (2005).
118
119
120
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[A]s the provision was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it
cannot be believed the framers of the instrument intended, that in
every case, the danger should run its course, until Congress could be
called together; the very assembling of which might be prevented . . .
by the rebellion.127

Lincoln promised a legal opinion from Attorney General
Bates to provide a more complete justification,128 which was
issued the next day.129 Drawing on The Federalist, Bates’s
opinion argued that each branch of the government was coordinate and could independently exercise its unique
constitutional powers free from the orders of the other.130
Taney lost his confrontation with Lincoln.
The
administration continued the system of military detentions.
Later that summer, Lincoln ordered the detention of Maryland
legislators, the step he would not take in April.131 In October, the
administration expanded the authority of generals to suspend
habeas corpus from Washington all the way up “the military line”
to Maine.132 Lincoln delegated to Secretary of State William
Seward the supervision of military arrests in the first year of the
war.133 Seward allegedly told the British ambassador to the
United States that he could “ring a [little] bell on his desk” and
arrest any citizen in the nation—”[c]ould even the Queen of
England do as much?”134 Despite this anecdote, the most reliable
estimates indicate that the government detained 864 civilians—
approximately half were from the border states, while a third
were Southerners—until the War Department took over
detentions in 1862.135 President Lincoln would suspend habeas
nationwide on September 24, 1862, two days after releasing the
preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, in a move to prevent
opposition to the first conscription law.136 Congress did not enact
a law authorizing the suspension of habeas corpus and
instituting a system of review until March 3, 1863, finally curing
the defect claimed by Milligan.137 Historian James G. Randall,

Message to Congress in Special Session, supra note 116, at 430–31.
Id. at 431.
10 Op. Att’y Gen. 74 (1861).
Id. at 81–86.
NEELY, supra note 10, at 15.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 19.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 24–26.
136 Proclamation Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus, Sept. 24, 1862, in 5 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 55, at 436–37. See also NEELY,
supra note 10, at 52.
137 See NEELY, supra note 10, at 68; see also Act of Mar. 8, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755
(1863).
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
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author of the widely read Constitutional Problems Under
Lincoln, estimated that the Lincoln administration detained
approximately 13,500 civilian prisoners.138 Neely’s more recent
work puts the number at about 12,600, though the records are
incomplete.139
Supporters of the Union came to believe that these measures
saved Maryland from secession.140 Merryman had become a
footnote to the start of the war, rather than a landmark for the
development of internal security policies during the War.141
Writing on Merryman, Harvard historian Charles Warren
observed that the lack of popular support for the Court depressed
the Chief Justice.142 Writing in 1863, Taney despaired that the
Court would not “ever be again restored to the authority and
rank which the Constitution intended to confer upon it.”143 He
concluded that the “supremacy of the military power over the
civil seems to be established, and the public mind has acquiesced
in it and sanctioned it.”144 Nevertheless, Warren argued, if
Taney had lived another four years, he would have seen his
opinion followed to the full in Ex parte Milligan. “Never did a
fearless Judge receive a more swift or more complete
vindication,” Warren wrote.145
But did he?
II.
Milligan was not just a vindication of Merryman, but a
dramatic expansion of it.
Merryman had demanded that
Congress suspend the writ of habeas corpus.146
Milligan
addressed a broader question: even if the writ were suspended,
can the President and Congress subject civilians behind the lines
to military trials when the civilian courts are open and
functioning?147 Unlike Merryman, Milligan did not reach the
Justices under the pressure of secession and sabotage, but came
up after the assassination of President Lincoln and Lee’s
surrender at Appomattox.148 Yet Milligan drove the courts into
138
139
140
141
142

(1922).

NEELY, supra note 10, at 115.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 29–30.
See id. at 29–34.
3 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES History 95–96

Id. at 96.
Id.
Id.
See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148–52 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
General Robert E. Lee surrendered the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia to
General Ulysses S. Grant in the town of Appomattox, Virginia on April 9, 1865. BURKE
143
144
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conflict once more with the political branches; this time not with
the President, but with Congress.
Milligan took place in the midst of inter-branch strife over
Reconstruction.149
The issues were complex, and centrally
involved the Constitution. If the Confederacy were considered an
enemy nation, the laws of war permitted recaptured territory to
be subject to occupation by Union military authorities.150 But if
the Southern states had never left the Union, as Lincoln had
argued from the beginning, then they could claim an immediate
restoration of their political rights.151 They could again pass
their own laws, run their own courts and police, and exercise
their rights in the federal government, which could have included
voting on the appropriations for the army and blocking
legislation to protect the new freedmen. In the unprecedented
circumstances of the Civil War, there were no rules for the readmission of rebellious states to the Union or how much
authority the national government could exercise in occupied
territory.152
Milligan came to the Court just as President Johnson and
radical Republicans in Congress were reaching their fateful split
over Reconstruction policy. Johnson sought relatively lenient
conditions for re-admission of the Southern states to the Union.
He declared the war over in December 1865 and allowed
Southern states to re-establish governments, sometimes with
former Confederates in positions of power.153 Johnson also
offered amnesty to those who swore an oath of loyalty to the
Union.154 He did not demand of the Southern states any more
protections for the freedmen than ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment—meaning that the rights of the former slaves would
be governed by state law—and did not require states to grant
them suffrage.155 Southern states responded by adopting new
DAVIS, TO APPOMATTOX 402 (1959). President Lincoln was assassinated on April 14,
1865. 3 WARREN, supra note 142, at 140.
149 3 WARREN, supra note 142, at 140.
150 See WILLIAM WHITING, WAR POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 244–49 (Lawbook Exch. 10th ed. 2002) (1871).
151 See id. at 248–49.
152 For a review of the issues, see ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 176–280 (1988); MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A
COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION 18631869 (1974); HAROLD M. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR
AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION 282–306 (1973); HERMAN BELZ,
RECONSTRUCTING THE UNION: THEORY AND POLICY DURING THE CIVIL WAR (1969).
153 See ALBERT E. CASTEL, THE PRESIDENCY OF ANDREW JOHNSON, at 49–52, 56
(1979); FONER, supra note 152, at 185–99 (1988); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN,
RECONSTRUCTION: AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 54–55 (Daniel J. Boorstin ed., 1961).
154 FRANKLIN, supra note 153, at 29–30.
155 CASTEL, supra note 153, at 44–45; FONER, supra note 152, at 239–40.
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constitutions that recognized the end of slavery, but little more.
Their legislatures quickly enacted “Black Codes” which sought to
keep the freedmen in a state of second-class citizenship by
restricting their economic and political rights.156 They held
elections that sent Congressmen and Senators, including former
Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens and former
generals and officials of the Confederacy, to the sitting of the
39th Congress in December 1865.157 Johnson sought a swift
reunion of the sundered Union by using the powers of Lincoln’s
energetic executive, which would set Reconstruction policy, to
restore the respect for state sovereignty of the antebellum
Constitution.
Congress would have little of it and refused to seat the
elected representatives of the new Southern governments.158
Radical Republicans wanted to provide the freedmen with a level
of economic and political equality denied them by the Southern
governments. In April 1866, Congress enacted the Civil Rights
and Freedman Bureau bills over President Johnson’s veto.159
Radicals also believed that military government had to continue
in the South because Union troops were the surest guarantee for
the security and rights of the freedmen when state governments
in the South could not be trusted.160 President Johnson went to
the country to oppose the radicals, but the 1866 midterm
elections gave them a tremendous victory.161 In less than two
years, they would use their majority to place the South under
military government, strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction,
and bring Johnson within one vote in the Senate of being the
only President impeached and removed from office.162
Milligan came to the Court in the midst of this strife, and
had a significant impact on the struggle, but its origins reached
back two years to the tentative months when Abraham Lincoln’s

CASTEL, supra note 153, at 47–48; FONER, supra note 152, at 199–201.
See John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI.
L. REV. 375, 452–53 & n.372 (2001); Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering
the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1066–67 & n.100 (1984).
158 See CASTEL, supra note 153, at 55; CHARLES FAIRMAN, 6 OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 117 (Paul A.
Freund ed., 1971); FONER, supra note 152, at 239.
159 CASTEL, supra note 153, at 70–71, 75; see also FAIRMAN, supra note 158, at 125–
28.
160 See FONER, supra note 152, at 273–76.
161 See id. at 267; see also MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF
ANDREW JOHNSON 15–16 (1973) [hereinafter “BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF
ANDREW JOHNSON”].
162 See FONER, supra note 152, at 273–75; CASTEL, supra note 153, at 192; BENEDICT,
THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, supra note 161, at 92–93.
156
157
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re-election had been in doubt.163 Lambdin Milligan was an
Indiana Copperhead Democrat who wanted peace with the
Confederacy.164 In an odd coincidence he had joined the Ohio Bar
and placed first in the same examination as Edwin Stanton, who
would become Lincoln’s Secretary of War and would approve
Milligan’s detention and conviction.165
Milligan fervently
believed that secession was legal and that Lincoln and the Union
had overstepped their constitutional authority in waging the
Civil War.166 He took an active role in Democratic politics in
Indiana and ran for the party’s 1864 nomination for governor,
but his strict anti-war position lost.167
His opposition apparently went beyond political measures.
Milligan organized the secret Democrat society, known as the
Order of American Knights, or the Sons of Liberty.168 With
Indianapolis printer Harrison Horton Dodd as the Grand
Commander, Milligan was appointed a “major general” of the
Sons of Liberty along with a few other prominent Democrats in
the state.169 Although they planned attacks on prisoner of war
camps, rebellion against Union authority, and establishment of
an independent Northwestern Confederacy, none of these plans
came to fruition.170 That did not stop Dodd, however, from
accepting money from Confederate spies in Canada to pay for the
planned revolt.171 Acting on a tip by an informant, Union officers
found 400 revolvers and ammunition at Dodd’s printing shop.172

163 Kenneth M. Stampp, The Milligan Case and the Election of 1864 in Indiana, 31
MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 41, 41–42 (1944)
164 See Frank L. Klement, The Indianapolis Treason Trials and Ex Parte Milligan, in
AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 104 (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1981) [hereinafter “Klement,
The Indianapolis Treason Trials”];; Allan Nevins, The Case of the Copperhead Conspirator,
in QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION 90 (John A. Garrety ed., 1962), at
109–110.
165 Klement, The Indianapolis Treason Trials, supra note 164, at 104.
166 Id.
167 No good biography exists of Milligan, but there are several helpful articles about
him and his case. See, e.g., Darwin Kelley, Lambdin P. Milligan’s Appeal for State’s
Rights and Constitutional Liberty during the Civil War, 66 IND. MAG. HISTORY 263 (1970);
Klement, supra note 165; Allan Nevins, supra note 164; Stampp, supra note 163. A short
book is DARWIN KELLEY, MILLIGAN’S FIGHT AGAINST LINCOLN (1973). For a broader
examination of political opposition to Lincoln in the Midwest, see FRANK L. KLEMENT, THE
COPPERHEADS IN THE MIDDLE WEST (1960).
168 See Nevins, supra note 164, at 111.
169 J. HOLT, REPORT OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL ON THE “ORDER OF AMERICAN
KNIGHTS,” OR “THE SONS OF LIBERTY”: A WESTERN CONSPIRACY IN AID OF THE SOUTHERN
REBELLION 4 (1864).
170 See Klement, The Indianapolis Treason Trials, supra note 164, at 106; Stampp
supra note 163, at 48.
171 Klement, The Indianapolis Treason Trials, supra note 164, at 107.
172 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
96–98 (1998).

YOO

10/14/2009 6:52 PM

2009]

Merryman and Milligan (and McCardle)

523

The conspiracy suited the needs of the powerful Republican
Governor, Oliver Morton. Worried about his re-election and the
fate of the Republican Party in the 1864 elections, Morton
ordered the arrest of Milligan and his fellow conspirators.173
Morton appears to have urged a military trial because its
proceedings would run through the election season.174
Successfully draping Indiana Democrats in the mantle of
disloyalty, Morton won re-election by a comfortable margin in
October,175 as did Lincoln in November,176 no doubt helped more
by Sherman’s capture of Atlanta than anything.177
At the end of the proceedings, a military commission of seven
army officers convicted four of the conspirators.178 It sentenced
three of them, including Milligan, to death.179 It had not helped
that the ringleader, Dodd, escaped from his room above the postoffice and made it to Canada, and that one of Milligan’s comrades
had turned informant.180 With his re-election secure, however,
Governor Morton decided to recommend commutation of their
sentences to the military authorities, who remained unmoved.181
His opponent in the election, Democrat Joseph E. McDonald, a
former congressman and state attorney general, journeyed to
Washington to personally meet with Lincoln to plead for
clemency.182 Lincoln read over the trial record, found some
errors, and told McDonald that there would be “such a jubilee
over yonder” in Virginia—anticipating Lee’s surrender to
Grant—that “we shall none of us want any more killing done.”183
He promised McDonald, “I will still keep them in prison awhile to
keep them from killing the new government.”184 Lincoln’s
assassination on Good Friday, April 14, 1865, prevented him
from keeping his promise.185 President Johnson, who had
convened a military commission to quickly try and execute the
assassins, was in no mood for mercy and approved the death
sentences of Milligan and his co-defendants.186
Klement, The Indianapolis Treason Trials, supra note 164, at 107–08.
See Stampp, supra note 163, at 51–52.
See Klement, The Indianapolis Treason Trials, supra note 164, at 110.
Id. at 113.
DONALD, supra note 55, at 531.
See Klement, The Indianapolis Treason Trials, supra note 164, at 108, 114.
Id. at 459.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 459–60.
182 Klement, The Indianapolis Treason Trials, supra note 164, at 104; see also IND.
REPUBLICAN STATE CENT. COMM., OLIVER P. MORTON OF INDIANA: SKETCH OF HIS LIFE
AND PUBLIC SERVICE 48 (1876) (detailing the re-election of Governor Morton).
183 FAIRMAN, supra note 158, at 197.
184 Id.
185 See id.; DONALD, supra note 55, at 596–99.
186 FAIRMAN, supra note 158, at 196–97.
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On May 10, Milligan filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the
federal circuit court in Indianapolis.187 The next day, the two
federal judges on circuit—Justice David Davis and Judge David
McDonald—sent a remarkable letter to the President.188 They
asked that Johnson delay execution of the sentence until the
federal courts had time to determine whether military
commissions had jurisdiction over civilians unconnected to the
military.189 Unlike Chief Justice Taney, they did not appear to
believe that they had the authority to order the President to
suspend the executions. Instead, they argued that allowing the
executions would open the government to the charge of
oppression and would be a stain on the national character.190
They also doubted the wisdom of the policy. The judges did not
question “the guilt of these men” or “that their trial had a most
salutary effect on the public mind by developing and defeating a
most dangerous and wicked conspiracy against our
government.”191 Rather, they argued that the trial had achieved
its purpose and that Indiana was now “quiet and peaceable.”192
Executing Milligan and his comrades now would only make them
“political martyrs.”193 Stanton also put in a plea for his former
bar mate.194 Johnson ultimately commuted Milligan’s sentence
to life imprisonment.195
The two judges on the circuit sent the case to the Supreme
Court, which heard oral arguments on March 5, 1866.196
Milligan’s counsel added three shrewdly chosen co-counsel:
Jeremiah Black, who had been Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, Attorney General and Secretary of State in the
Buchanan administration, and had been defeated for
confirmation to the Supreme Court in 1861 by one vote;197 James
A. Garfield, a brigadier general during the opening years of the
Civil War at age 31, Republican congressman from Ohio, and
future President;198 and David Dudley Field, brother of sitting
Justice Stephen J. Field and father of the Field Code that would
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 7 (1866).
See FAIRMAN, supra note 158, at 197–98.
Id. at 198.
Id.
Id. at 198–99.
Id.
Id.
Klement, The Indianapolis Treason Trials, supra note 164, at 115.
195 Id. at 116.
196 FAIRMAN, supra note 158, at 199–200.
197 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 9 (1866); Derek P. Langhauser,
Commentary, An Essay: Nominations to the Supreme Court of the United States:
Historical Lessons for Today’s Debate, 205 EDUC. L. REP. 553, 568 (West 2006).
198 IRA RUTKOW, JAMES A. GARFIELD 15–16 (2006); FAIRMAN, supra note 158, at 143;
Castel, supra note 153, at 19.
187
188
189
190
191
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be the basis of American civil procedure in the nineteenth
century.199 As Milligan’s chances rose with these choices, the
government’s odds dropped with its own. In addition to Attorney
General James Speed, who was not thought of as an able oral
advocate,200 the government added Henry Stanbery, who would
replace Speed as Attorney General that summer and would be
nominated by Johnson to a seat on the Supreme Court;201 and,
inexplicably, General Benjamin Butler, a Massachusetts lawyer
who had won notoriety for his tough occupation government of
the City of New Orleans.202 Butler, for example, had issued
General Order No. 28 that declared that any woman who showed
disrespect to a Union soldier or officer would be treated as “a
woman of the town plying her avocation.”203 He would be known
as “Beast Butler” throughout the South for decades.204 After an
unsuccessful military career, Butler would be elected to the
House of Representatives and would be the lead House
prosecutor of the Johnson impeachment before the Senate.205
The transcript of oral argument is lengthy, occupying sixtytwo pages of the U.S. Reports.206 Each side received three hours
of time; not exactly the days accorded Daniel Webster, but a
luxury under today’s standards.207 On April 3, 1866, the Court
announced that it was ordering the release of Milligan, who went
free on April 10.208 However, the Court did not release its
opinion until December.209 Justice Davis wrote for the Court that
these new tribunals had no jurisdiction over a citizen who was
not a resident of one of the rebellious states, not a prisoner of
war, and not in the armed forces of the Confederacy or the
Union.210 The law of war, which applied to combatants and the
battlefield, held no sway over “citizens in states which have
upheld the authority of the government, and where the courts
199 FAIRMAN, supra note 158, at 4; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW 340 (1973).
200 See FAIRMAN, supra note 158, at 201.
201 Congress reacted by decreasing the size of the Court by one seat. Keith E.
Whittington, Presidents, Senates, and Failed Supreme Court Nominations, 2006 SUP. CT.
REV. 401, 427 (2006).
202 FONER, supra note 152, at 45, 491–92.
203 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, supra note 90, at 2335.
204 See SHELBY FOOTE, THE CIVIL WAR: A NARRATIVE, FREDERICKSBURG TO MERIDIAN
105 (1963).
205 William H. Rehnquist, The Impeachment Clause: A Wild Card in the Constitution,
85 NW. U. L. REV. 903, 916 (1991).
206 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 22–84 (1866).
207 FAIRMAN, supra note 158, at 200.
208 THE MILLIGAN CASE 44 (Samuel Klaus ed., 1997).
209 FAIRMAN, supra note 158, at 214.
210 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 124–27 (1866); FAIRMAN, supra note
158, at 197-99; see also Klement, The Indianapolis Treason Trials, supra note 164, at
116–17.
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are open and their process unobstructed.”211 The Bill of Rights
demanded that Milligan receive a jury trial in federal court for
violations of civilian law, and these provisions could not be
waived in the face of emergency.212 “Wicked men, ambitious of
power, with hatred of liberty and contempt of law, may fill the
place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln; and if this right
is conceded, and the calamities of war again befall us, the
dangers to human liberty are frightful to contemplate.”213
Neither the President nor Congress, therefore, could impose
martial law that overrode the constitutional protections in a
criminal trial, except in cases of actual invasion in which the
“courts and civil authorities are overthrown.”214 What was good
for the occupation of Virginia, Davis concluded, was not good for
Indiana.215
Chief Justice Chase wrote a concurring opinion joined by
three other Justices.216 He found that Milligan fell within the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, which had authorized Lincoln to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus.217 The Act required the
military to supply the courts with lists of prisoners, and to
release the prisoners if a grand jury did not choose to indict them
of a crime.218 Milligan had not been indicted by a grand jury, so
he was entitled under the statute to go free. Chase refused to
reach the question of whether the President and Congress
together could authorize the use of military commissions in
wartime: “When the nation is involved in war, and some portions
of the country are invaded, and all are exposed to invasion, it is
within the power of Congress to determine in what states or
districts such great and imminent public danger exists as
justifies the authorization of military tribunals.”219 Chase would
have allowed Congress to authorize military tribunals in wartime
even when the courts were open; a necessity, he argued, because
the courts might prove incompetent to stop threatened danger or
judicial officers might be aligned with the rebels.220
It was not the judgment in Milligan that was particularly
objectionable, but rather the reasoning of the Court’s opinion.
Congress’s authority was not directly presented in Milligan.
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Id. at 121.
Id. at 125–26.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 132 (Chase, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 133–34.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 140–41.
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Justice Davis’s desire to address its scope, and to limit it in such
broad terms, immediately plunged the Court into the maelstrom
of Reconstruction politics. When the Court announced the
opinion in December, its implications for congressional plans for
Reconstruction were obvious to all. Milligan suggested that any
continuation of military occupation in the South was
unconstitutional, and signaled that Republicans would have to
count the judiciary among their opponents.221 The Republicans
immediately recognized Milligan as a challenge, with Thaddeus
Stevens declaring it to be a “most injurious and iniquitous
decision [that] has rendered immediate action by Congress upon
the question of the establishment of governments in the rebel
States absolutely indispensable.”222 “In the conflict of principle
thus evoked, the States which sustained the cause of the Union
will recognize an old foe with a new face,” wrote The New York
Times.223 “The Supreme Court, we regret to find, throws the
great weight of its influence into the scale of those who assailed
the Union and step after step impugned the constitutionality of
nearly everything that was done to uphold it.”224 Comparing
Milligan to Dred Scott, Harper’s Weekly declared that the
decision “is not a judicial opinion; it is a political act.”225 The
New York Herald raised the idea of reforming the Court: “a
reconstruction of the Supreme Court, adapted to the paramount
decisions of the war, looms up into bold relief, on a question of
vital importance.”226
Just as Republican papers attacked Milligan, Democratic
papers praised it. The National Intelligencer, which often
represented the views of the Johnson administration, attacked
the Court’s critics: “[A]s in war times, these monopolists of
patriotism denounced those who upheld the sacred liberties of
the citizen as guaranteed by the Constitution, so now, in the
midst of peace, they assail those who maintain the rights of the
States as guaranteed by that same instrument.”227 Democrats in
Congress similarly interpreted Milligan as requiring a quick readmission of the Southern States to the Union and decried the
Republican vitriol hurled at the Court. Aaron Harding criticized
the Republicans for their “attempt to bring into ridicule and
contempt the last refuge of liberty [the Supreme Court] for the
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See id. at 124–25; CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 251 (1865).
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 251 (1865).
3 WARREN, supra note 142, at 151.
Id.
Id. at 154.
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oppressed.”228
Michael Kerr went further, accusing the
Republicans in Congress of attempting to “govern this country
without the aid of the unrepresented States, the Constitution, or
the Supreme Court.”229 It was no favor to the Supreme Court
when, on the anniversary of the Battle of New Orleans, it was
toasted at a Democratic party dinner as “the great conservative
power of the government; never more needed or better
appreciated than now.”230
Johnson’s annual message to
Congress, delivered in December 1866, had asked for the
immediate re-admission of the Southern states because they had
met his condition of adopting the Thirteenth Amendment.231 The
new Republican majorities ignored him. Now Johnson and his
Democrat allies sought to project the image that the Court was
on their side.
The possibility that the Court would throw its weight behind
Johnson worried congressional Republicans. They nonetheless
proceeded with their plans for Reconstruction and, on March 2,
1867, passed a Reconstruction Act that required the adoption of
black suffrage, new constitutions adopted by majority vote, and
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment before the Southern
states would regain their representation in Congress.232 To
guarantee the equal rights of the freedmen, Congress created five
military districts in the former Confederacy to provide military
protection.233 The army would have the duty to protect all
persons, to suppress insurrections, disorder, and violence, and to
punish those who disturbed the peace.234 A supplementary Act
gave the military commanders the authority to remove state
officers who impeded Reconstruction.235 Johnson vetoed the Act
and in his message argued that with the surrender of the
Confederacy, the war powers of the government had ended, and
the Southern states had resumed their place in the constitutional
structure.236 He also claimed that military occupation of the
South violated Milligan.237 Congress overrode Johnson’s veto on
the very same day by far more than the two-thirds majorities
required: 135 to 48 in the House, and 38 to 10 in the Senate.238
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1167 (1865).
Id. at 624.
FAIRMAN, supra note 158, at 222–23.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1–5 (1866).
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428, 428–29; see also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 139 (1993).
233 SCHWARTZ, supra note 232, at 139.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 FAIRMAN, supra note 158, at 307–08.
237 Id. at 308.
238 Id. at 308–09.
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Enforcement of the Reconstruction Act produced the first
demonstration of Milligan’s desuetude as military commissions
continued in the South. From the end of the war until January 1,
1869, the Union army conducted 1,435 military trials, though
they steadily declined throughout this period.239 Some of them
involved cases from the war, some from Reconstruction; some
were of Southern civilians, some were of Union soldiers. The
Reconstruction Act allowed military commanders to use
commissions to try civilians when the civilian courts were
thought to be inadequate. Military governors became embroiled
in reviewing state enforcement of the laws governing everyday
life. They suspended various laws, such as debt collection, that
were being enforced in a discriminatory manner by state officials,
and substituted military enforcement when state authorities
applied criminal and civil laws unjustly. This state of affairs did
not end until all of the Southern states rejoined the Union.240
Some lower federal courts relied upon Milligan to stop these
military commission trials, but the record shows that they were
unsuccessful in preventing their widespread use in the South.241
In the first year of Reconstruction, the Supreme Court
studiously refused to entertain cases by states, such as
Mississippi and Georgia, challenging the constitutionality of
military government in the South.242 One might say that
Congress had even sought the cooperation of the other two
branches in Reconstruction—the reliance on military governors
recognized President Johnson’s paramount role, and Congress
had expanded habeas jurisdiction in a February 1867 law
designed to allow freedmen to seek the protection of the federal
courts.243
But that changed with the case of Ex parte
McCardle.244
Colonel William McCardle, the editor of the
Vicksburg Times, vituperatively attacked Reconstruction. In one
editorial he called the military governors “each and all infamous,
cowardly, and abandoned villains,” and in others he called for
resistance to the military, Southern government by whites only,
and opposition to the Fourteenth Amendment.245 Union officers
arrested McCardle on November 8, 1867, and brought him before
a military commission to face trial for inciting insurrection,
NEELY, supra note 10, at 176–77.
Id. at 178–79.
241 See 3 WARREN, supra note 142, at 164–65.
242 See, e.g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867) (dismissed as
political question); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867) (same).
243 Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
244 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
245 SCHWARTZ, supra note 232, at 140; William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to
Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229, 236 n.42 (1973).
239
240
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disorder, and violence and impeding Reconstruction.246 When the
federal district court denied McCardle’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, he appealed to the Supreme Court under the new
1867 habeas law.247
When the Supreme Court announced that it would hear Ex
parte McCardle in January 1868, it was apparent that a test of
the constitutionality of the Reconstruction Act was on the way. 248
It was no coincidence that McCardle was represented by
Milligan’s lawyers.249 The Johnson administration made its
views known by refusing to defend the statute.250 General Grant
arranged for the Army to be represented by Lyman Trumbull and
Matthew Carpenter, two Republican Senators who had played
important roles in the consideration of the Reconstruction
Amendments.251 To illustrate the depths to which the Court had
become embroiled in the fight over Reconstruction, one of the
days of oral argument was interrupted when Chief Justice Chase
had to leave to preside over the organization of President
Johnson’s impeachment trial in the Senate.252
Reports from oral argument suggested that the Court was
sympathetic to McCardle’s argument that the Reconstruction Act
violated Milligan.253 Congress responded swiftly. In January
and February of 1868, it considered legislation requiring that six
Justices agree before the Court could strike down federal
legislation.254 The House passed the bill, but the Senate could
not reach a consensus.255 However, after the end of oral
argument in McCardle, Congress overrode President Johnson’s
veto and removed the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over
habeas corpus appeals under the 1867 statute.256 Only after
Johnson’s acquittal, and Grant’s election to the Presidency, did
the Court announce in 1869 that it accepted the stripping of its
jurisdiction and would not reach the merits of the McCardle
petition.257 Thus, Milligan became the motivating factor that led

246 Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 322 (1867); SCHROEDER-LEIN & ZUCZEK,
supra note 235, at 184.
247 SCHWARTZ, supra note 232, at 140.
248 Id.; FAIRMAN, supra note 158, at 449–50.
249 See McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 323; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 9
(1866).
250 See HYMAN, supra note 152, at 504.
251 Id.
252 FAIRMAN, supra note 158, at 455.
253 Id.
254 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 478 (1868).
255 Stanley I. Kutler, Ex Parte McCardle: Judicial Impotency? The Supreme Court
and Reconstruction Reconsidered, 72 AM. HIST. REV. 835, 838 (1967).
256 Van Alstyne, supra note 245, at 240.
257 Id. at 243–44 (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512–15 (1868)).
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to the only clear example of congressional jurisdiction-stripping
in the Court’s history.258
III.
In concluding, it is worth putting forth some hypotheses
about why the Court’s decisions in Merryman and Milligan
sparked such sharp reactions from the political branches. In
Merryman, Chief Justice Taney issued a writ to President
Lincoln, who refused to follow it—probably the only
unambiguous example of a President of the United States
refusing to obey an order of the federal judiciary. Despite the
praise for Milligan in later years, it prompted Congress to enact
the only clear example of jurisdiction-stripping in the Court’s
history. Along with the Jeffersonian impeachment of Justice
Samuel Chase259 and President Franklin Roosevelt’s courtpacking plan,260 these Civil War episodes remain among the most
direct challenges to the Supreme Court’s authority by the elected
branches of government.
Most of the blame surely lies with the Justices themselves.
In Milligan, the majority could have resolved the case on the
narrow statutory ground that the Habeas Corpus Act required
release, an outcome that would probably have received the
approval of a unanimous Court. Instead, Justice Davis’s majority
stretched to address a constitutional question with obvious
implications for the great struggle between President Johnson
and the Reconstruction Congress. The Court may have believed
that it was helping to settle the matter, but it only contributed to
the political instability and constitutional conflict over the
occupation of the South. Its views did not prevail, as military
government continued over the former states of the Confederacy
until the Compromise of 1877 removed Union troops in exchange
for finding Republican Rutherford Hayes the winner of the 1876
presidential election.261 The Court would have been better served
by following the doctrine of judicial restraint, best expressed by
Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,262
to interpret statutory questions to avoid constitutional questions.
258 For a contrary view, see STANLEY I. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND
RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS (1968); Van Alstyne, supra note 245.
259 See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE
YOUNG REPUBLIC 76–82 (1971).
260 See
WILLIAM LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 83–84 (1995).
261 Vincent P. DeSantis, Rutherford B. Hayes and the Removal of the Troops and the
End of the Reconstruction, in REGION, RACE AND RECONSTRUCTION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
C. VANN WOODWARD 417, 417–18 (J. Morgan Kousser & James McPherson eds., 1982).
262 297 U.S. 288, 356 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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Deciding Milligan only on the application of the Habeas Corpus
Act would have kept the Court out of a constitutional
confrontation between the political branches that it could not
settle.
Merryman tells a different story. Like Davis, Chief Justice
Taney sought to insert the federal courts into the great
constitutional controversy of the day. Taney, of course, had a
history of overreaching. He had wanted to settle the question of
slavery in the territories in Dred Scott, but instead only
accelerated the movement toward Civil War.
Merryman,
however, unlike Milligan, presented no obvious statutory or
jurisdictional means to evade the constitutional question of
whether the President could suspend habeas corpus during a
period of rebellion without the consent of Congress. Merryman
was an American citizen held by the executive branch without
criminal charge; he had a right to appeal to a federal court to
require the government to explain the legal basis for his
detention.
Taney’s mistake was that he gave Lincoln no time to
organize the federal government’s response to the unprecedented
challenge of secession. Civil War was a calamity unlike any that
the nation had faced before or since. Taney deliberately sought
out a constitutional confrontation with the executive branch
during the chaotic circumstances of the first weeks of the war,
when the very security of the capital city was at stake. It would
have been understandable and reasonable if Taney had given
President Lincoln the benefit of the doubt and allowed the
military time to restore the security of the BaltimoreWashington, D.C. area before pressing forward with Merryman.
Taney, however, believed that the Supreme Court had the final
and immediate authority to resolve the constitutional question of
habeas suspension, regardless of the circumstances.263
Despite their different settings, both Merryman and Milligan
have that in common. The terrible divisions of the Civil War,
and the Taney Court’s role in hastening its coming, had not yet
weaned the Justices from their attachment to judicial supremacy.
Merryman and Milligan displayed a remarkable lack of deference
to the political branches during wartime. War is the subject
under which the structural advantages of the President and
Congress are at their height, and where the courts have the least
competence.264 War involves unpredictability and uncertainty,
263
264

126.

See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F.Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
My views on the separation of powers in wartime can be found in YOO, supra note
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unforeseen circumstances, difficult tradeoffs between competing
values, and, in a Civil War, the highest of stakes. While some
believe that the courts should still decide cases challenging
government authority without taking account of wartime
conditions, this approach ignores the costs of judicial
intervention, not only to the war effort but also to the Court.
Merryman and Milligan reveal the wages of judicial supremacy,
not just to the President and Congress, but to the institution of
the Supreme Court as well.

